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INTRODUCTION
Town lot drilling in the villages of Edison, Mt. Gilead, and
Cardington, Ohio, since 1962, coupled with the issuance of ten-acre
minimum spacing regulations,' has led to recent widespread use of
voluntary pooling devices for oil and gas leases of Ohio lands. Ohio
has not yet developed a jurisprudence on the law of voluntary pool-
ing, but its courts have considered and applied implied covenant
doctrines. As will be seen, the analogies between implied covenant
problems and voluntary pooling problems suggests a rationale to
be applied in voluntary pooling cases.
Compulsory pooling will not be considered in this article,2
although cases in which pooling was accomplished under the order
of a state agency are cited where the manner of pooling is not
treated as consequential by the court. Pooling by separate agree-
ment will not be considered, since such agreements usually provide
clauses dealing with the problems to be discussed. The pooling 8
* Of the firm of Emens & Ashworth, Marion, Ohio; Chairman, Ohio State Bar
Association Special Committee on Oil and Gas.
1 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4159.031 (Page 1965) became effective March 10, 1964,
as did emergency ten-acre minimum spacing regulations issued by the Chief of the
Division of Mines, Ohio Department of Industrial Relations. Final spacing regula-
tions effective May 10, 1964, provided in Rule IV(C)
(1) No permit shall be issued to drill, deepen, reopen, or plug back a well
for the production of oil or gas unless the proposed well is located
(a) upon a tract or drilling unit containing not less than 10 acres;
(b) not less than 460 feet from any well drilling to, producing from,
or capable of producing from, the same pool;
(c) not less than 230 feet from a boundary of the subject tract or
drilling unit.
The validity of these regulations has not been tested.
2 Mandatory pooling of tracts having less than ten acres or the prescribed
minimum distances with sufficient adjacent acreage to permit a single well location
can result from application by the person having the right to drill under Rule IV (D)
(2), issued April 28, 1964, by the Chief of the Division of Mines, Ohio Department
of Industrial Relations.
3 Although pooling frequently refers to one-well units and unitization usually
refers to larger or more comprehensive units, these terms will be treated herein as
synonymous.
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devices principally treated here are the community lease and the
pooling clause.
Stated in simplest form, the problems considered in connection
with community leases arise where A and B each separately own
adjoining tracts of land and execute one lease to C describing both
tracts. In the pooling clause situation A and B each execute sepa-
rate leases to C in which C is expressly given the right at some
future time to pool or combine their lands. If A, B, and C expressly
provide details concerning the pooling of their lands, the lease pro-
visions will be enforced. Litigation has arisen principally where
specific provisions do not cover the question in issue. In such situ-
ations the courts must imply rules or standards to determine the
relationship among A, B, and C. Unfortunately, the courts have not
considered whether these implications are implications of law or fact.
I. THE COMMUNITY LEASE
A community lease is brought about where two or more owners
of separate tracts of land execute a single lease describing their
entire acreage.' As used herein, community leases include only
such leases as achieve pooling upon execution, but not leases con-
taining a provision permitting the inclusion of additional parcels
within the leased area by the lessee at some future time. Future
pooling is considered later under sections on pooling clauses.
Relationship Between Lessors: Apportionment
Problems concerning community leases usually involve the
relationship between the lessors and not between the lessors col-
lectively and the lessee. The rights of the lessee under a community
lease are indivisible because the lessee has specifically bargained for
the right to treat all included tracts as an entirety in order to per-
petuate and develop the lease and to avoid any necessity for re-
specting internal boundary lines.5
4 Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Terms 39 (1957), define a community
lease as
a single lease covering two or more separately owned tracts of land. A
community lease may arise from the execution of a single lease by the several
owners of separate tracts or by the execution of separate but identical leases
by the owners of separate tracts individually when each lease purports to
cover the entire consolidated acreage.
r Higgins v. California Petroleum & Asphalt Co., 109 Cal. 304, 41 Pac. 1087
(1895); Parker v. Parker, 144 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Lynch v. Davis,
79 W. Va. 437, 92 S.E. 427 (1917).
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The fundamental community leases question is whether roy-
alties must be apportioned among all lessors or whether royal-
ties will be paid only to the owner of the tract from which produc-
tion is obtained. As will be seen from the cases that follow, the
courts frequently are faced with a lease containing no specific lan-
guage dealing with the question and, therefore, must imply or refuse
to imply the apportionment result.6
The courts which have considered community leases have not
adopted a common rationale to justify their implication of royalty
apportionment. The early decisions recognized that since the lessee's
rights are indivisible, the lessee could drill upon one included parcel
while holding all other included parcels without any payment of
royalties or rentals to the other community lessors if royalties were
not apportioned. In addition to this equitable consideration, the
courts also noted that the community lease usually provides for
payment of royalties to the lessor without a specific provision re-
quiring payment to the owner of the land from which production is
obtained. Higgins v. California Petroleum & Asphalt Co.,' was one
of the first cases to consider the problem of apportionment in a com-
munity lease. In Higgins, a twenty year lease of a deposit of bitu-
minous rock and a deposit or liquid asphaltum was executed by the
owners of separate, adjacent tracts. The owner of one tract conveyed
her entire interest to the lessee and all mining activities occurred on
her tract. The other owner sued the lessee for one-half of the roy-
alty, and judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. The court presumed
that the royalties were to be divided equally, noting that the lease
provided that royalties were to be paid "to the parties of the first
part" ' and that the lessee was not restricted to mining activities on
any particular part of the land.
6 In addition to deciding whether to apportion, a court must decide how to
apportion. The court in Higgins v. California Petroleum & Asphalt Co., 109 Cal.
304, 41 Pac. 1087 (1895), suggested a sharing of royalty on the basis of comparative
value. This suggestion would necessitate consideration of thickness of pay, porosity,
permeability, position on the structure, and many other factors necessary to estimate
the amount of oil under each parcel included within the community lease. Absent a
lease provision to the contrary, the courts usually apportion royalties on the basis
of acreage contributed by each lessor. Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Tipken, 190 Okla.
396, 124 P.2d 418 (1942); Parker v. Parker, supra note 5; Lynch v. Davis, supra
note 5. It is submitted that the acreage basis of apportionment is both practical and
fair because first, the division of royalties can readily be determined and, second, when
the community lease is executed the parties seldom can estimate the amount of oil
under each parcel.
7 Higgins v. California Petroleum & Asphalt Co., supra note 5; Shell Petroleum
Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., 185 La. 751, 170 So. 785 (1936).
8 Supra note 5.
9 Id. at 306, 41 Pac. at 1088. (Emphasis added.)
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The states which apportion royalties do so either as a matter
of law or by an implication of fact. Texas apportions royalties as
a matter of law under a community lease 10 and California and
West Virginia substantially follow this rule.11 It is my opinion that
such a rule fosters stability of leasehold titles and avoids contro-
versy in a situation conducive to fraud, while the implication-of-
fact rule which appears in the Oklahoma and Louisiana decisions
does not. In Oklahoma, the parol evidence rule has been relaxed
and the making of a bare community lease raises a presumption,
which may be rebutted by written or oral evidence, of an intention
to apportion royalties. 2 In Louisiana the lessor's intent is examined
on a case-by-case basis which has led to decisions which are hard
to reconcile.
13
The courts which consider apportionment a question of fact
have found neither the lesser interest clause nor the entireties clause,
which commonly appear in oil and gas leases, controlling in decid-
ing whether apportionment results from the execution of a com-
munity lease. Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Tipken 4 considered the
following lesser interest clause:
If said lessor owns a less interest in the above-desribed land
than the entire and undivided fee-simple estate therein, then the
rentals and royalties herein provided for shall be paid the lessor
only in the proportion which . . . [the lessor's] interest bears to
the whole and undivided fee. 1
While apportionment was found to result from the facts in the case,
the court specifically refused to base its decision upon the lesser
interest clause. As was pointed out by the dissenting opinion, a lesser
interest clause is intended to protect the lessee from paying full
royalties to a lessor whose title has failed in whole or in part. The
10 See French v. George, 159 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Parker v.
Parker, supra note 5, at 305.
11 See Higgins v. California Petroleum & Asphalt Co., supra note 5; Clark v.
Elsinore Oil Co., 138 Cal. App. 631 P.2d 476 (1934); Hamilton v. McCall Drilling
Co., 131 W. Va. 750, 50 S.E.2d 482 (1948); Lynch v. Davis, supra note 5.
12 Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Tipken, 190 Okla. 396, 124 P.2d 418 (1942). Com-
pare Seal v. Banes, 183 Okla. 203, 80 P.2d 657 (1938).
13 In United Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v. Eaton, 153 So. 702 (La. Ct. App. 1934), the
court refused to apportion royalties under a community lease and appeared to condemn
the apportionment result. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co.,
supra note 7, appproved the apportionment result on the basis of rather common oil
and gas lease language. The distinction between the cases is hard to justify and
has been criticized. Hoffman, Voluntary Pooling and Unitization 44 (1954).
14 170 Okla. 396, 124 P.2d 418 (1942).
15 Id. at 397, 124 P.2d at 419.
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usual entireties clause of an oil and gas lease is designed to deal
with subsequent division of the premises, not with separate owner-
ship at the time the lease is executed,'16 unless the entirities clause
specifically contemplates ownership in severalty when the lease is
executed.' 7
If the lessors execute a lease, where apportionment is implied in
law, describing more land than is owned by any of them, appor-
tionment will occur even though the community lease does not
specifically name all lessors who are to be parties thereto.' 8 More-
over, ratification of the original community lease by an additional
owner of lands included therewith has been held to achieve the
apportionment-of-royalties result.19
16 In Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., supra note 7,
at 759, 170 So. at 787, parcels approximately three-quarters of a mile apart were
included under one lease which contained the following entireties clause:
That, regardless of any such change or division, said land shall be developed
and operated, and all royalties accruing hereunder shall be treated, as an
entirety; such royalties shall at all times be divided among and paid to the
owners thereof in proportions according to the acreage and/or interest
owned by each.
The court admitted this clause dealt with future changes in ownership, but was
obviously influenced by the apportionment result it required.
17 See Hardwicke & Hardwicke, "Apportionment of Royalty to Separate Tracts:
the Entireties Clause and the Community Lease," 32 Texas L. Rev. 660 (1954), for
a thorough discussion of this point.
'8 Irick v. Hubbell & Webb, 280 P.2d 733 (Okla. 1955). The court said:
The fact that here, instead of all owners signing one lease, all owners signed
separate identical instruments makes no difference. As in the Peerless case
. . . the signing of the instruments covering the entire tract bespoke an
intention on the part of each lessor that the tract would be developed as a unit.
Id. at 735.
Hoffman has criticized the Irick case on the ground that the decision might
require the apportionment of royalties where lessor A innocently describes land he
does not own and lessor B, by a separate instrument, later describes the same lands
which are in fact owned by B. Hoffman, "Some Problems in Pooling and Unitization,"
Seventh Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 219, 227-30 (1956). I
cannot agree with Hoffman's criticism because, where additional properties are
innocently included in a separate lease, mutual mistake may justify reformation of
the instrument. In Harris v. Wood County Cotton Oil Co., 222 S.W.2d 331 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949), the defendant believed he owned lot 12 and the western half of
lot 11 and leased both, although plaintiff in fact owned the western half of lot 11.
The lessee obtained a permit from the Texas Railroad Commission and drilled a
producing well on lot 12. The plaintiff contended that these facts required an appor-
tionment of royalties. The court held for the defendant, commenting that the control-
ling element was the intention to pool and unitize, which was lacking in this case.
Accord, Seal v. Banes, supra note 12.
19 Louisiana Canal Co. v. Heyd, 189 La. 903, 181 So. 439 (1938) (ratification by
acceptance of delay rentals). In Ward v. Gohlke, 279 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955), undivided-interest owners in four tracts (some of whom did not own interests
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It has been held that apportionment of royalties will not be
implied where nonadjacent parcels are included under one com-
munity lease. 0 If apportionment is implied in law where separate
owners execute one lease describing all properties, it is difficult to
justify a distinction between abutting and nonabutting properties.21
While a majority of the courts have approved the apportion-
ment of royalties where two or more owners of separate tracts
execute one lease, the contrary result has obtained where part of a
single parcel under lease is later divided in ownership. The Ohio
Supreme Court in the landmark case of Northwestern Ohio Natural
Gas Co. v. Ullery 22 refused to apportion royalties when faced with
a subdivision of lands subject to an oil and gas lease. It is now well
settled that the fact that a subdivision of land subject to a lease
will not achieve apportionment does not prevent the court from
apportioning royalties under a community lease.23 Apportionment
under a community lease where separate ownership of the lands
exists prior to the lease, but nonapportionment where separate
ownership occurs subsequent to the lease, is difficult to rationalize.2
in all tracts) executed one lease describing all four tracts and identifying the parties
lessor as "'the undersigned heirs and devisees under the will of Fred W. Gohlke.'"
Id. at 425. Three other undivided-interest owners ratified the lease and one interest
owner executed a separate lease. The court held pooling occurred as to all who
eventually became lessors.
20 Lusk v. Green, 114 Okla. 113, 245 Pac. 636 (1926). The court was appar-
ently influenced by parol evidence.
21 Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., supra note 7,
apportioned royalties on an acreage basis despite the inclusion under one lease of two
parcels approximately three-quarters of a mile apart.
22 6S Ohio St. 259, 67 N.E. 494 (1903).
23 Jephat v. McRae, 276 S.W. 669 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925), cited and fol-
lowed the Ullery case. Parker v. Parker, supra note 5, held that the Japhat rule did
not apply to a community lease and allocated royalties on an acreage basis. Galt v.
Metscher, 103 Okla. 271, 229 Pac. 522 (1923), established the Japhat-Ullery rule in
Oklahoma under peculiar facts. One hundred and sixty acres were under lease and the
royalty in the south eighty acres was conveyed. The lessee attempted to drill on the
exact line but missed by four feet and the court held that all royalty went to the
owner of the tract on which the well was drilled with no liability to the other
owner to drill an offset. (Query the bottom hole location.) In Peerless Oil & Gas
Co. v. Tipken, supra note 12, the court admitted the nonapportionment rule applied
to conveyances of separate parcels after the lease is executed but held that apportion-
ment of royalties occurred under a community lease.
24 Lynch v. Davis, supra note 5, did not recognize the distinction based upon
division of ownership of the land prior and subsequent to the lease. The court ap-
portioned royalties under a community lease but relied upon and cited the minority
view in Wettengel v. Gormley, 160 Pa. 559, 28 Atl. 934 (1894), on second appeal, 184
Pa. 354, 39 Atl. 57 (1898), involving a division of the land after execution of the
lease. Writers on the subject have pointed to the inconsistency of refusing to appor-
tion royalties in the Ullery situation while apportioning royalties in the community
19651
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Relationskip Between Lessors: Real Property Concepts v. Contract
Concepts
The Higgins court held that adjoining owners shared equally
in royalties without analyzing the relationship between the lessors
further than to point out that they did not become tenants in
common. Subsequent California decisions have ignored the lan-
guage in Higgins disclaiming a tenancy-in-common result and have
held that execution of a community lease achieves a cross con-
veyance of royalty interests. 25 Texas cases appear to follow the
California cross-conveyancing theory,26 although recent Texas de-
cisions 27 cast some doubt upon the continuing validity of that rule,
particularly as applied to specific pooling clauses. The better analy-
sis would seem to be that the lessors by executing one lease describ-
ing their entire lands impliedly agree inter se that royalties under
the lease will be shared in proportion to the acreage contributed by
each .2 This contract analysis finds support in the absence of words
of conveyance or grant between the lessors in the ordinary com-
munity lease.
Avoidance of real-property concepts and utilization of contract
concepts should help to avoid difficulties the courts have experienced
in connection with partial surrender and conveyances of separate
tracts included in a community lease. A series of California decisions
has held that a partial surrender by the lessee does not extinguish
the right of the lessor of the surrendered acreage to continue to
participate in apportioned royalties, but denies to the owners of the
retained acreage the comparable right to participate in subsequent
lease situation. See Hoffman, Voluntary Pooling and Unitization 18 (1954); O'Quin,
"Separately Owned Tracts Under Single Lease as Affected by Entirety Clause and
Related Provisions," Eighth Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation
125 (1957).
25 Tanner v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 20 Cal. 2d 814, 129 P.2d 383 (1942);
Agajanian v. Cuccio, 141 Cal. App. 2d 828, 297 P.2d 755 (1956).
26 Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 314, 159 S.W.2d 472 (1942). Although Veal v.
Thomason is frequently cited as Texas authority for the cross-conveyancing theory,
the court there placed emphasis upon specific clauses of the lease providing for the
sharing of royalties and construed these clauses to reflect an intention to achieve a
cross conveyance of royalty interests.
27 Tiller v. Fields, 301 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) ; Sohio Petroleum Co.
v. Jurek, 248 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
28 The cross-conveyance theory has been rejected in several jurisdictions. Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d (10th Cir. 1954) (pooling clause case); Shell
Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., supra note 7; Sinclair Crude
Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 326 P.2d 1051 (Okla. 1958) (pooling clause case).
A leading authority on the subject has also criticized the cross-conveyance theory.
Hoffman, Voluntary Pooling and Unitization 102-03 (1954).
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production obtained under a new lease of the surrendered acreage.29
In Texas the cross-conveyancing theory has received support, but
the result reached in the California cases has not been followed. In
Duffy v. Callaway 31 the court held that a partial surrender recasts
the acreage allocation in relationship to the acreage retained after
partial surrender. Presumably in Texas if all of A's lands were sur-
rendered by the lessee, A would no longer participate in production
under the community lease. The result is practical and probably
would reflect the intention of the parties had they considered the
question, but casts additional doubt upon the continuing vitality of
the cross-conveyancing theory in that state.
Adoption of the cross-conveyancing theory can multiply title
problems by splintering royalty interests. The problem is aggravated
where a conveyance of a specific tract included within a community
lease is made without reference to participation in the royalty
allocated under the entire lease. Under the cross-conveyance theory,
the grantor may be found to have retained his allocated royalty
participation in the remaining parcels despite having purported to
convey his entire interest in his separate parcel.' Under the contract
theory, a conveyance of the lessor's separate parcel without spe-
20 The first California case to consider the effect of a partial surrender was
Clark v. Elsinore Oil Co., 138 Cal. App. 6, 31 P.2d 476 (1934), in which A and B,
each owning adjoining forty acre tracts, executed one lease. The lease contained both
a royalty-apportionment provision and a surrender provision which was silent with
respect to the effect of surrender on royalty payments. The lessee surrendered seventy
acres and retained only ten acres on which he had drilled a well. The court held
that the plaintiff whose lands had been entirely surrendered continued to be entitled
to one-half of the royalties, citing the Higgins case. The court did not mention the
cross-conveyancing theory which would have provided a logical basis for the result.
In the well known case of Tanner v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 20 Cal. 2d 814, 129 P.2d
383 (1942), nine lots were included under a community lease. The lessee drilled on
lots 174 and 176 and surrendered the balance. The owners of lots 174 and 176 sued to
quiet title and to prevent the surrendered-lot owners from participating in royalties.
A specific clause provided, "this provision as to apportionment of benefits to be
operative, notwithstanding the surrender by the Lessee of any land described herein,"
and the court held apportionment of royalties from the two producing lots survived
partial surrender, despite a 1937 quiet title judgment with respect to the surrendered
lots. In Tanner v. Olds, 29 Cal. 2d 110, 173 P.2d 6 (1946), the owners of one of the
lots which had earlier been surrendered and had later leased their lot and obtained
production. The question on appeal was whether drainage of oil from lots 174 and
176 by the newly productive well on the lot which had earlier been surrendered fur-
nished sufficient grounds for a forfeiture of the surrendered-lot owner's right to
receive apportioned royalty from lots 174 and 176. The court was faced with the
earlier 1937 quiet title judgment which was no longer subject to appeal, and held that
participation in royalties from lots 174 and 176 did not cease.
30 309 S.AV.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
31 Agajanian v. Cuccio, 141 Cal. App. 2d 828, 297 P.2d 755 (1956), held that a
bare conveyance of land did not include the lessor's community-lease royalty interests.
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cific mention of the lessor's royalties under the community lease-
hold will normally convey the lessor's entire interest in both his
tract and apportioned royalties. 2 In Texas partition has been held
to terminate apportionment of royalties where all lessors join in the
proceedings . 3 Although the action of the lessors cannot free any
part of the lease from the right of the lessee to develop and operate
the entire premises as an entirety, unpooling by the lessors of a
portion of the premises may increase the burden of the lessee, if
oil is obtained on the portion severed from the pool, by requiring
separate tankage, metering, and accounting.34 It is submitted that
a fair result would be obtained if the courts permitted the operator
to deduct from royalty payments the additional cost of separate
tankage, or metering facilities and separate accounting.
POOLING CLAUSES
With increasing frequency, modem oil and gas leases contain
a pooling clause under which the lessee is granted authority at some
future time to pool the premises under lease with other premises.35
The same result was indicated in Tanner v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., supra note 29,
where the court said:
The royalty interest thus transferred by each landowner to his colessors is an
incorporeal hereditament in gross . . . and the grantee's interest in the
oil produced upon the property of one of the colessors is entirely separate
and distinct from royalty interest retained by him in oil which might be
produced from his own premises ...
The incorporeal hereditament owned by the grantor in the oil produced
from the land of the colessors, existing in gross, obviously does not follow
the conveyance of the lessor's land, but can only be conveyed by a specific
transfer of that interest.
Id. at 820, 129 P.2d at 386-87. The cases do not clearly indicate whether the cross-
conveyance theory means all royalty is thrown into hotchpot or whether each
lessor reserves his own allocated portion of royalty and conveys only the balance.
The quotation from Tanner seems to suggest the latter.
32 Merrill Eng'r Co. v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 192 Miss. 378, 5 So. 2d 666 (1942).
The Merrill case involved a separate pooling agreement, but the court specifically
rejected any distinction based upon this fact. The court said that rights to unit
royalties passed as covenants running with the land.
33 Garza v. DeMontalvo, 147 Tex. 525, 217 S.W.2d 988 (1949). In Landgrebe
v. Rock Hill Oil Co., 273 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), a partition of two
of the three tracts originally included under a community lease was found not to
unpool the third tract.
34 The court in Garza v. DeMontalvo, supra note 33, specifically pointed out
that the lessee had raised no objection to the partition. The decision suggests that
the Texas courts may protect the lessee from increased burdens resulting from any
change from allocated to separate royalty payments.
35 Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Terms 185 (1957), define a pooling clause as
a lease clause authorizing a lessee to "pool" or join the particular leased
[Vol. 26
PROBLEMS IN VOLUNTARY POOLING
Although these clauses vary between detailed clauses setting forth
the manner and many of the results of such pooling to short clauses
giving broad authority to affect such pooling, 6 the lessee by express
provision or by implication is usually granted the power to treat
the entire premises as one lease; and the lessor usually agrees to ac-
cept royalties under his lease upon that part of production which is
apportioned to his lease. Unlike community leases, pooling does
not occur upon execution of the lease but only at some future time
when the lessee undertakes a pooling effort. Emphasis in pooling
questions thus is shifted from the lessor-lessor relationship to the
lessee-lessor relationship.
Lessee-Lessor Relationship: Real Property Concepts v. Contract
Concepts
Legal writers have devoted considerable attention to the rela-
tionship between the lessor and lessee resulting from the exercise of
rights granted in the pooling clause.38 Unfortunately, real-property
concepts were applied at an early date to this relationship. Texas
and California have both indicated that pooling effects a cross con-
veyance of royalty interests, but these cases principally concerned
community leases, not pooling achieved by the exercise of a power
granted in a pooling clause. 9 The trend of authority is against the
premises with other leases for the purpose of aggregating a tract sufficient
for a well permit under applicable spacing regulations. Also, a lease clause
authorizing the lessee to unitize the leased premises with other parcels.
This author does not entirely agree with the definition suggested by Williams and
Meyers, because pooling does not necessarily have any relationship to spacing, nor
need broad unitization be contemplated in a pooling clause.
36 See 4 Williams, Oil and Gas Law § 669 (1964), citing numerous pooling
clauses.
37 The right to develop, produce, and operate the entire pooled lands without
regard to internal boundary lines is that for which the lessee specifically bargains in
the pooling clause. E.g., in Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 902, 31 So. 2d
10, 13 (1947), the court said, "The law is well settled that the lessee's obligation to
drill a well is indivisible in its nature. .. ."
38 E.g., Hardwicke, "Problems Arising Out of Royalty Clauses in Oil and Gas
Leases in Texas," 29 Texas L. Rev. 790 (1951); Hoffman, "Pooling and Unitization
Clauses in Oil Leases," 1 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 103 (1955) ;
Hoffman, "Some Problems in Pooling and Unitization," Seventh Annual Institute on
Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 219 (1956); Merrill, "Unitization Problems: The
Position of the Lessor," 1 Okla. L. Rev. 119 (1948) ; Shank, "Some Legal Problems
Presented by the Pooling Provisions of the Modern Oil and Gas Leases," 23 Texas
L. Rev. 150 (1944); Williams & Meyers, "The Effect of Pooling and Unitization
Upon Oil and Gas Leases," 45 Calif. L. Rev. 411 (1957).
39 Tanner v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 20 Cal. 2d 814, 129 P.2d 383 (1942) ; Veal
v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 431, 159 S.W2d 472 (1942).
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application of the cross-conveyancing theory." In Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Peterson,41 the court strongly rejected the cross-con-
veyance theory. Sinclair Crude Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm' n.'
squarely held that no cross conveyance occurred where separate
unit agreements were executed by members of the Cherokee tribe,
who enjoyed exemption from Oklahoma production and pro-ration
taxes so long as they continued to hold their homestead lands.
The court held the exemption applied with respect to the allocated
portion of unit oil since no cross conveyance occurred. It does not
appear that the application of the cross-conveyance theory can be
as forcefully urged with respect to units created under a pooling
clause as with community leases, because community leases achieve
their legal effect by the direct action of the lessors, while pooling
under pooling clauses takes effect, if at all, only upon the future
act of the lessee with respect to lands usually not identified when
the lease is executed.43
Exercise of the pooling power at some indefinite time after
the lease is executed has led some courts to suggest that the rela-
tionship between the lessor and lessee is that of principal and
agent.44 The first case to express the agency theory did so to
explain a fiduciary duty. In lines v. Globe Oil c Ref. Co.4 5 the
lessee was granted the power by the owners of twenty-one lots
in Oklahoma City to include other lots in the same subdivision
block, but the lessee attempted to include lots which had been
condemned for oil and gas purposes. The court stated that the
lessee "was virtually the agent of the lessors." 4 Application of
agency concepts suggests that the death of the lessor-principal or
an assignment by the lessee might terminate the agency relation-
ship. This result has been avoided by classifying the relationship
as a power coupled with an interest.47
40 Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 173 Kan. 183, 245 P.2d 176 (1952);
Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Jurek, 248 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
41 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954).
42 326 P.2d 1051 (Okla. 1958).
43 Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Jurek, supra note 40, distinguished Veal v. Thomason,
supra note 39, on the ground that joint ownership, i.e., cross-conveyancing occurred
only under a community lease.
44 E.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954).
45 184 Okla. 79, 84 P.2d 1106 (1938).
46 Id. at 81, 84 P.2d at 1109. (Emphasis added.)
47 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, supra note 44, the court stated that
the relationship between the lessor and the lessee was "at least, analogous to that of
principal and agent. It is in the nature of a power coupled with an interest, and is,
therefore, irrevocable." Id. at 933. The power-coupled-with-an-interest theory had
earlier been suggested by a commentator on the subject. Hardwicke, supra note 38,
at 812.
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Perhaps the greatest conceptual difficulty in the application of
agency concepts arises with respect to the fiduciary duty. As an
agent the lessee should have a fiduciary responsibility to his lessor
under which self-dealing would be proscribed. Logically the lessee
might be permitted to pool only with a lease of a stranger unless
full disclosure were made to the lessor-principal. Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Peterson,48 a leading case, considered this fiduciary
relationship and in so doing raised questions which offer little com-
fort to lessees. The court noted that an agent of the lessee had met
with the lessors prior to execution of the leases, circulated lease
forms, specifically explained the pooling clause, and apparently
revealed enough of the lessee's plans to satisfy the court that a full
disclosure occurred. The court imposed a stringent standard of
disclosure upon the lessee when it said: "It is equally well settled
that an agent may act with respect to matters involving interests
adverse to his principal where the principal possesses full knowledge
of the facts and consents thereto." " Does this mean that the lessee
who initially has no specific plans to pool must return to his lessor
immediately prior to pooling to disclose fully? What if the lessor
then strongly objects?
Application of property concepts also has led to unsuccessful
efforts to attack pooling clauses as a violation of the Rule Against
Perpetuities ° It is submitted that the correct analysis of the rela-
tionship between the lessor and lessee is that it is that of contracting
parties. Hoffman has so concluded; consequently he defines a pooling
clause as
a declaration and agreement by the lessor that the lessee may at a
future date operate the lessor's property in conjunction with other
properties, in which event production on another property will
perpetuate the lessor's lease and provide the measure of the les-
sor's royalty by the method of allocating a proportionate part of
such production to his lease.61
48 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954).
49 Id. at 934. (Emphasis added.)
50 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, supra note 48, is the leading case rejecting
the perpetuities argument. The court rejected the cross-conveyance theory, but stated
that even if the cross-conveyance theory were applied, a failure to specify when
pooling could occur would be taken to imply pooling within a reasonable time, cer-
tainly within the period permitted under the Rule Against Perpetuities. The Ime-
case, supra note 45, construed a specific authorization to pool at any time to mean
only within a reasonable time. See Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., which also
held the Rule Against Perpetuities not to be violated by a pooling clause, but stated
that under the pooling clause all rights were fixed and vested when the lease was
executed and no future estates were created.
51 Hoffman, Voluntary Pooling and Unitization 100 (1954). See Kenoyer v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., supra note 40 (contract theory).
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Consistent with the contract theory is the rule that the exercise
of the pooling authority granted by the lease does not alter other
express provisions of the lease.52 For instance, royalties will be
paid on the same stated fraction set forth in the lease but applied
to that part of total unit production allocated to the lease under the
unit.53 However, a lease containing a pooling clause will ipso facto
terminate if delay rentals are not paid, drilling commenced, or
production obtained either on the lease or on the pooled unit within
the time specified.
Judicial Limitation of the Lessee's Pooling Power
Inasmuch as the pooling clause deals with future pooling, it is
seldom possible to avoid a lack of certainty. The court in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Peterson54 upheld an extremely broad pooling
clause which contemplated field-wide unitization and gave the lessee
authority to "unitize, pool, or combine all or any part of above
described lands with other lands in same general area . . . ." In
response to assertions that the clause was too broad and uncertain
to be enforceable, the court said:
Anticipatory provisions in leases for the commitment by the lessee
of such leases to unitization, of necessity must be in general terms.
Neither the lessor nor the lessee has any way of knowing at the
time the lease is taken the facts with respect to which it will
be necessary for the lessee to apply his power. It is not practicable
for the lessee to await the ascertainment of such facts. He knows
from experience that because of the possibility of many changes
in ownership of the lessor's interest as time goes on, it may be
difficult to effect an agreement for unitization after the lease is
taken, if the right to unitize is not included in the lease itself. 55
52 York v. Harper, 91 So. 2d 423 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
53 In Dillon v. Holcomb, 110 F2d 610 (5th Cir. 1940), the lease on one of two
pooled tracts provided for a one-eighth royalty interest, a sliding-scale override, and
an oil payment of $7,500 to the lessor. The court held that these payments must be
made to the lessor out of production allocated to that lease. Thus the allocation was
strictly on an acreage basis, but one lessor, pursuant to his lease, received a far
larger percentage of that allocation than did the other lessor. The same reasoning
was applied in Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Southwest Natural Prod. Co., 221 La.
608, 60 So. 2d 9 (1952).
54 Supra note 48.
55 Id. at 933. In Tiller v. Fields, 301 S.W2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), the
court approved a pooling clause which authorized pooling with other lands "in the
immediate vicinity," notwithstanding the lack of any acreage limitation.
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Since frequently the pooling power is not carefully defined, the
courts have implied standards to limit the pooling powers of the
lessee. These standards are closely analagous to the standards under
implied covenant doctrines. The most widely accepted standard is
the so-called "good faith test"" which frequently becomes a sub-
jective good faith test. It is the opinion of this writer that the
proper standard is an objective, prudent operator test analogous to
the test seen in implied covenant cases. In Imes v. Globe Oil &, Ref.
CoY.' the court refused to permit the lessee, after obtaining produc-
tion on the lots originally included in the lease, to include six addi-
tional lots which had been condemned as valueless for oil and gas
purposes. The language of the opinion suggests an examination of
the lessee's subjective intent although the pooling of condemned
oil and gas properties with producing properties could hardly qualify
as conduct of a prudent operator. In Phillips Petroleum Company
v. Peterson,58 the court supported an objective test of the lessee's
conduct when it said:
A lessee is bound by implied covenants in the lease to diligently
explore and develop the lease, and to do so under a fair unitiza-
tion plan, if unitization is effected; to market the production if the
oil and gas is found in paying quantities; to do that which an
operator of ordinary prudence, having due regard for the interests
of both the lessor and the lessee, would do (cited cases omittted);
and in case of unitization, to act fairly and in good faith, with due
regard for the lessor's interests, and to provide for a fair appor-
tionment of the oil produced (cited cases omitted). The lessee
clearly may not act arbitrarily or capriciously (cited cases
omitted) .r9
Several months earlier, the same court in Boone v. Kerr-McGee Oil
Indus. ° approved a trial court's finding that additional wells would
56 Imes v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., supra note 45, at 81, 84 P.2d at 1109, noted
that while the interest of the lessee and lessors were to some extent mutual at the
time the lease was executed, these interests parted somewhat when pooling was
attempted and therefore the lessee "was bound to use good faith."
5' Supra note 45.
58 Supra note 48.
59 Supra note 48, at 934.
60 217 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1954).
61 Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48, N.E. 502 (1897), is the leading
Ohio case. See Ohio Fuel Supply Co. v. Schilling, 101 Ohio St. 106, 127 N.E. 873
(1920) ; Kachelmacher v. Laird, 92 Ohio St. 324, 110 N.E. 933 (1915) ; Coffinberry
v. Sun Oil Co., 68 Ohio St. 488, 67 N.E. 1069 (1903); Tedrowe v. Shaffer, 23 Ohio
App. 343, 155 N.E. 510 (1926).
02 Sauder v. Mid-Continental Petroleum Corp., 292 U.S. 272, 279 (1934).
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have been wasteful, would have yielded no greater ultimate recov-
ery of oil and gas, and would have resulted in a financial loss to
the driller, all of which suggests an objective good faith test.
If the proper standard is whether the lessee complies with the
prudent operator test when pooling is undertaken, it is submitted
that the questions for determination will be whether the pooling
would have been undertaken in nearly the same manner, at approxi-
mately the same time, by an ordinary prudent operator who, based
upon information available at the time of exercise of the pooling
power, is reasonably attempting to ensure that each lessor receives
royalties reflecting the amount of oil and gas under his land by a
pooling plan which is economically feasible to the lessee. A sub-
jective test of the lessee's intention when exercising the pooling
power would reward ignorance and protect unskilled operators.
Ohio, lacking a jurisprudence on pooling questions, but having
a substantial jurisprudence on the law of implied covenants, 61 may
find by analogy a useful rationale to be applied to future pooling
questions. Implied covenant doctrines are fictions implied "from the
relation of the parties and the objective of the lease . ,, ;2 In the
lessor-lessee relationship the lessor normally reposes a substantial
trust and confidence in the lessee to drill an exploratory well, de-
velop the premises, diligently operate, market the product, and
protect the premises against drainage. So also under a broad pooling
clause does the lessor trust the lessee to utilize the pooling power
to insure that the lessor will receive his fair share of royalties. The
receipt of royalties from oil and gas is the principal objective of
the lessor. This objective constitutes the foundation of implied
covenant doctrines and should also justify restrictions upon the
lessee's pooling power. The implication of restrictions upon the
lessee's pooling power is therefore properly an implication, not of
fact, but of law, arising out of the relationship of the parties and
the objective of the lease.
Where an oil and gas lease does not specify when an exploratory
well must be drilled, the courts have implied a covenant that the
lessee will drill within a reasonable time.6 3 The reasonable time rule
has also been applied to determine when the lessee may effectuate
pooling,64 and raises questions which might have been, but usually
were not, answered by application of the prudent-operator test. The
courts have carefully considered whether pooling can be undertaken
before or after production is obtained on the unit, and whether
63 Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., supra note 61.
64 Thomas v. Ley, 177 Okla. 150, 57 P2d 1186 (1936); Imes v. Globe Oil & Ref.
Co., mipra note 45; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, vtpra note 44.
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pooling immediately prior is valid.65 Pooling after production and
pooling immediately prior to the expiration of the primary term
both readily suggest a plan designed solely for perpetuating leases.
However, these facts should not foreclose a tardy lessor from pooling
if the pooling plan meets the prudent-operator standard and only
incidentally and permissibly minimizes unnecessary delay rentals
and drilling costs. The Oklahoma court in Imes v. Globe Oil & Ref.
Co. appeared to suggest that once production was obtained no
pooling could be undertaken. However, the Ines decision was sub-
sequently clarified by Gillham v. Jenkins 66 which upheld pooling
after production was obtained. The peculiar fact situation in Gill-
ham was that wartime regulations prohibited gas production on
less than 160 acres, but the original well was drilled on eighty acres
and could not be produced without pooling. However, the Gillham
court construed Imes to be a good faith case and not a ruling against
pooling after production.
The Louisiana courts have tightly construed pooling clauses
to limit the lessee's power in situations which do not meet the
standards of an ordinary prudent operator. In Wilcox v. Shell Oil
Co.6 7 only twenty acres of a 550 acre lease were pooled with an
adjacent twenty acres on which production had already been ob-
tained. The court applied a subjective good faith test which led it to
accuse the defendant of avoiding the alternatives of either drilling or
paying delay rental. The court said the pooling was "very much to
its interest because by it Shell could save a rental payment of
$2,750.00 and at the same time avoid the expense of drilling a well
on the Wilcox lease within the 12 months remaining of the primary
term in an effort to keep it alive beyond that term." 6 While the
circumstances may have indicated conduct which satisfied neither
the good faith test nor the ordinary-prudent-operator test, it is sub-
mitted that the avoidance of delay rentals and the expense of drilling
unnecessary wells is that for which the lessee bargains when a pool-
ing clause is inserted in an oil and gas lease. In Mallett v. Union Oil
& Gas Corp.,69 the Louisiana court again tightly construed a pool-
ing clause to reach a result which could have been obtained by ap-
plication of the prudent operator test to the pooling effort. In
Mallett, a 160 acre lease was assigned to the defendant after the
assignor had unsucessfully sought an extension on the lease only six
65 E.g., Tiller v. Fields, supra note 27. See Note, "The Right of the Lessee
to Pool the Mineral Interest of the Lessor Before and After the Expiration of the
Primary Term," 10 Sw. L.J. 165 (1956).
66 206 Okla. 440, 244 P.2d 291 (1952).
67 226 La. 417, 76 So. 2d 416 (1954).
68 Id. at 423, 76 So. 2d at 418.
09 232 La. 157, 94 So. 2d 16 (1957).
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weeks prior to the expiration of the primary term. The assignee-
defendant filed a declaration of unitization three days prior to the
expiration of the primary term and pooled 53.3 acres of the lease
with another lease on which production had been obtained three
months earlier. This conduct might not meet the prudent operator
standard. Diggs v. Cities Serv. Oil Co. 70 specifically referred to the
subjective intent of defendants who had attempted pooling, but the
court did not criticize the trial court's consideration of geological
and other technical facts and opinions. Despite a suggestion to the
contrary by one writer,7- the validity of efforts to utilize a pooling
clause should not be tested by conservation principles because a
pooling clause creates no more than a contractual relationship be-
tween a limited number of private individuals.
Where A and B each grant leases of 500 acres to C, C may
desire to pool only fifty acres from each lease into a unit. One deci-
sion 72 has upheld partial pooling accomplished under a general pool-
ing clause with no specific authority for partial pooling. Although
leading writers on the subject have contended that a partial pool-
ing effects a division of the lessee's obligations under the lease73 the
majority view in the United States is to the contrary. Consequently,
delay rentals need not be paid on excluded acreage and the lease
does not expire at the end of the primary term with respect to ex-
cluded acreage after unit production is obtained.74 The majority
view is justified because the lessee bargains for the right to treat the
lease as an entirety. Implied covenant doctrines are now frequently
applied to protect the lessor's interests in excluded acreage and to
70 24 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1957).
71 Long, "The Pooling Clause in an Oil and Gas Lease," 11 Okla. L. Rev. 1
(1958). In Boone v. Kerr-McGee Oil Indus., supra note 60, at 64, the pooling clause
gave the lessee the option to pool "when in Lessee's judgment it is necessary or
advisable to do so in order to properly develop and operate said lease premises so as
to promote the conservation of oil, gas or other minerals.. . ." The court did not in-
terject a new principle to be applied with respect to pooling clauses but merely con-
strued the express language of the pooling clause. To interject the public interest and
the term "conservation" into every judicial examination of pooling clauses would
ignore the obvious intention of the parties where the word "conservation" does not
appear in the pooling clause itself.
72 Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., supra note 40.
7 Williams & Meyers, supra note 38. The authors defend the minority rule of
Texas Gulf Producing Co. v. Griffith, 218 Miss. 109, 65 So. 2d 447 (1953), and
criticize the majority rule expressed in Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 31
So. 2d 10 (1947). The Griffith case involved pooling by application of equitable
pooling doctrines which are peculiar to that state. The court was unwilling to expand
that doctrine to hold that pooling achieved by equitable measures affected excluded
acreage.
74 E.g., Scott v. Pure Oil Co., 194 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1952); Kenoyer v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., supra note 40; Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co., supra note 73.
[Vol. 26
1965] PROBLEMS IN VOLUNTARY POOLING 437
reduce the risk that the lessee will seek to pool only a fraction of
the lease with little or no geological justification for his action.75
75 Pohlemann v. Stephens Petroleum Co., 197 F.2d 134 (10th Cir. 1952);
Nunley v. Shell Oil Co., 76 So. 2d 111 (La. Ct. App. 1954). In Trawick v. Castle-
berry, 275 P2d 292 (Okla. 1954), declaration of a new unit resulted in exclusion of
seventy-three of the eighty acres under lease. Cancellation of the lease as to seventy-
three acres was denied for lack of evidence that additional development would have
been profitable.
